http://en.for-ua.com/analytics/2007/08/06/121201.html

Copyright © Terry Hallman 2007. All rights reserved.

Part Two

Center for Social Enterprise

It is almost impossible to overstate the need for social enterprise in Ukraine. The nation is plagued by widespread socioeconomic problems and deficiencies, with a host of disparate, haphazard, uncoordinated efforts aimed at solving them. In order to understand the overwhelming critical need for social enterprise and a formal national center to facilitate social enterprise, an operational definition for social enterprise is essential.

Enterprise is any organizational activity aimed at a specific output or outcome. Once the output or outcome – the primary objective – is clear, an organization operating to fulfill the objective is by definition an enterprise. Business is the most prominent example of enterprise. A business plan, or organizational map, provides a reference regarding how an organizational scheme will operate to produce a specific outcome: provision of products or services in a way to create profit. Profit in turn is measured numerically in terms of monetary gains, the “bottom line.”

This is the function of classic capitalism, which has proven to be the most powerful economic engine ever devised.

An inherent assumption about capitalism is that profit is defined only in terms of monetary gain. This assumption is virtually unquestioned in most of the world. However, it is not a valid assumption. Business enterprise, capitalism, must be measured in terms of monetary profit. That rule is not arguable. A business enterprise must make monetary profit, or it will merely cease to exist. That is an absolute requirement. But it does not follow that this must necessarily be the final bottom line and the sole aim of the enterprise. How this profit is used is another question. It is commonly assumed that profit will enrich enterprise owners and investors, which in turn gives them incentive to participate financially in the enterprise to start with.

That, however, is not the only possible outcome for use of profits. Profits can be directly applied to help resolve a broad range of social problems: poverty relief, improving childcare, seeding scientific research for nationwide economic advancement, improving communications infrastructure and accessibility, for examples – the target objectives of this particular project plan. The same financial discipline required of any conventional for-profit business can be applied to projects with the primary aim of improving socioeconomic conditions. Profitability provides money needed to be self-sustaining for the purpose of achieving social and economic objectives such as benefit of a nation’s poorest, neediest people. In which case, the enterprise is a social enterprise.

In this case, for the project now being proposed, it is constructed precisely along these lines. Childcare reform as outlined above will pay for itself in reduced costs to the state. It will need investment for about five years in order to cover the cost of running two programs in parallel: the existing, extremely problematic state childcare scheme, and the new program needed to replace it for the purpose of giving children a decent life. The old program will be phased out as the new program is phased in. After this phase transition is complete, the state will from that time forward pay out less money for state childcare. Children will have a better life, and will be more likely to become healthy, productive assets to the nation rather than liabilities with diminished human development, diminished education, and the message that they are not important – the basis for serious trouble. There is no need whatsoever to give these children less than a good quality of life as they grow and mature. The only problem is reorganization of existing resources.

The microenterprise and microfinance component will support itself, as was the case in a previous effort in Tomsk oblast, Russia, and is the case with most microfinance programs around the world.

The Internet component taps into an almost completely undeveloped market sector in Ukraine, and provides a strategy to deploy a nationwide high-speed Internet communication infrastructure profitably – estimated minimum 15% return on investment annually. In doing so, it provides badly needed high-speed Internet communication infrastructure across most of Ukraine at a price that much of the population can already afford, but don’t have now because it is not available. Profits can then be used to help subsidize social development programs. This is only one example for creating a profit center for the purpose of providing funding for social benefit.

The Center for Social Enterprise will engender and foster exactly this sort of enterprise thinking for the purpose of further addressing and resolving the wide range of desperate social needs throughout Ukraine. Programs can be designed and deployed all over the country – as long as there is a strong nucleus – center – to make them happen.

The Center for Social Enterprise will be created in cooperation with Kharkiv National University. It will require a one-time foundation grant of $5 million, after which it will be permanently self-sustaining. That amount can be deposited into any one of several existing banks, with returns of about 14% per year in interest on a hrivnia deposit account. That amount provides CSE a comfortable operating budget of $500,000 per year and a comfortable reserve margin above operating costs. Note that funding for projects designed and implemented by CSE is a separate budget account.

A Brief Overview of Social Enterprise

The following section is excerpted from “Social Enterprise Typology”, by Kim Alter, April 13, 2006. Excerpts are rearranged and edited for presentation in this document.

Preliminary Definitions

Embedded Social Enterprises - Social programs and business activities are one and the same.Non-profits create Embedded Social Enterprises expressly for programmatic purposes. The enterprise activities are "embedded" within the organization's operations and social programs, and are central to its mission. Social programs are self-financed through enterprise activities and thus, the embedded social enterprise also functions as a sustainable program strategy.

Integrated Social Enterprises - Social programs overlap with business activities, often sharing costs and assets. Organizations create integrated social enterprises as a funding mechanism to support the nonprofit's operations and mission activities.

External Social Enterprises - Social programs are distinct from business activities. Nonprofits create external social enterprises to fund their social services and/or operating costs. The enterprise's activities are "external" from the organization’s operations, but support its social programs through supplementary financing.

Social Enterprise Operational Models

Social enterprise models fall into three distinct categories: fundamental models, combined models, and enhanced models. Fundamental models can be combined and enhanced to achieve maximum social value and social benefit creation.

Fundamental models

Fundamental social enterprise models include:

· Entrepreneur Support Model

· Market Intermediary Model

· Employment Model

· Fee-for-service Model

· Service subsidization model

· Market linkage model

· Organizational support model

- Entrepreneur Support Model

The entrepreneur support model of social enterprise sells business support and financial services to its target population or "clients," self-employed individuals or firms. Social enterprise clients then sell their products and services in the open market

The entrepreneur support model is usually embedded: the social program is the business, its mission centers on facilitating the financial security of its clients by supporting their entrepreneurial activities. The social enterprise achieves financial self sufficiency through the sales of its services to clients, and uses this income to cover costs associated with delivering entrepreneur support services as well as the business' operating expenses. Economic development organizations, including microfinance institutions, small and medium enterprise (SME) and business development service (BDS) programs use the entrepreneur support model.

- Market Intermediary Model

The market intermediary model of social enterprise provides services to its target population or "clients," small producers (individuals, firm or cooperatives), to help them access markets. Social enterprise services add value to client-made products, typically these services include: product development; production and marketing assistance; and credit. The market intermediary either purchases the client-made products outright or takes them on consignment, and then sells the products in high margin markets at a mark-up.

The market intermediary model is usually embedded: the social program is the business, its mission centers on strengthening markets and facilitating clients' financial security by helping them develop and sell their products. The social enterprise achieves financial self-sufficiency through the sale of its client-made products. Income is used to pay the business' operating expenses and to cover program costs of rendering product development, marketing and credit services to clients. Marketing supply cooperatives, as well as fair trade, agriculture, and handicraft organizations frequently use the market intermediary model of social enterprise. Common types of business that apply this model are: marketing organizations, consumer product firms, or those selling processed foods or agricultural products.

- Employment Model

The employment model of social enterprise provides employment opportunities and job training to its target populations or "clients”, people with high barriers to employment such as market dysfunction, physical and/or mental disability, homeless, at-risk youth, and ex-offenders. The organization operates an enterprise employing its clients, and sells its products or services in the open market. The type of business is predicated on the appropriateness of jobs it creates for its clients, regarding skills development, and consistency with clients' capabilities and limitations, as well as its commercial viability.

The employment model is usually embedded: the social program is the business, its mission centers on creating employment opportunities for clients. Social support services for employees such as "job coaches," soft skill training, physical therapy, mental health counseling, or transitional housing are built into the enterprise model and create an enabling work environment for clients. The social enterprise achieves financial self-sufficiency through the sales of its products and services. Income is used to pay standard operating expenses associated with the business and additional social costs incurred by employing its clients.

- Fee-for-service Model

The fee-for-service model of social enterprise commercializes its social services, and then sells them directly to the target populations or "clients," individuals, firms, communities, or to a third party payer.

The fee-for-service model is usually embedded: the social program is the business, its mission centers on rendering social services in the sector it works in, such as health or education. The social enterprise achieves financial self-sufficiency through fees charged for services. This income is used as a cost-recovery mechanism for the organization to pay the expenses to deliver the service and business expenses such as marketing associated with commercializing the social service. Surpluses (net revenue) may be used to subsidize social programs that do not have a built-in cost-recovery component.

- Service subsidization model

The service subsidization model of social enterprise sells products or services to an external market and uses the income it generates to fund its social programs.

The service subsidization model is usually integrated: business activities and social programs overlap, sharing costs, assets, operations income and often program attributes. Although the service subsidization model is employed primarily as a financing mechanism–the business mandate is separate from its social mission–the business activities may enlarge or enhance the organization's mission.

Non-profits that implement service subsidization social enterprises operate many different types of businesses, however, most leverage their tangible assets (building, land, or equipment) or intangible assets (methodology, know-how, relationships, or brand) as the basis of their enterprise activities. Commercialization of core social services leads to enterprise activities that are close in nature to the organization's social programs and may enhance the mission; whereas leveraging physical assets to sell to the public may result in an enterprise that is very different from the organization's social programs. In financial terms the business benefits from leveraging and cost sharing relationships, and provides a stream of unrestricted revenue to "subsidize" or wholly fund one or more social services. Service subsidization is one of the most common types of social enterprises because it can be applied to virtually any nonprofit. The service subsidization model may conceivably grow into an organizational support model if it becomes profitable enough to throw off revenue to the parent organization.

Service subsidization model social enterprises can be any type of business. Those that leverage intangible assets such as expertise, propriety content or methodologies, or exclusive relationships tend toward service businesses that commercialize these assets: consulting, counseling, logistics, employment training or marketing. Those that leverage tangible assets such as buildings, equipment, land, employees, computers, etc. may launch any number of enterprises that utilize infrastructure and capital assets: leasing, property management, product-based retail businesses; copying, transportation or printing services, etc.

- Market linkage model

The market linkage model of social enterprise facilitates trade relationships between the target population or “clients,” small producers, local firms and cooperatives, and the external market. The social enterprise functions as a broker connecting buyers to producers and vice versa, and charging fees for this service. Selling market information and research services is a second type of business common in the market linkage model. Unlike the market intermediary model, this type of social enterprise does not sell or market clients' products; rather it connects clients to markets.

The market linkage model can be either embedded or integrated. If the enterprise is standalone; its mission revolving around linking markets, and its social programs support this objective, the model is embedded. In this case, the social program is the business, income generated from enterprise activities is used as a self-financing mechanism for its social programs. Market linkage social enterprises are also created by commercializing an organization's social services or leveraging its intangible assets, such as trade relationships, and income is used to subsidize its other client services. In this second example, social program and business activities overlap, hence follows the integrated model . Many trade associations, cooperatives, private sector partnership and business development programs use the market linkage model of social enterprise. Types of social enterprises include import-export, market research and broker service.

- Organizational support model

The organizational support model of social enterprise sells products and services to an external market, businesses or general public. In some cases the target population or "client" is the customer.

The organizational support model is usually external: Business activities are separate from social programs, net revenues from the social enterprise provide a funding stream to cover social program costs and operating expenses of the nonprofit parent organization. Although organizational support models may have social attributes, profit not social impact is the perquisite for this type of social enterprise. This model of social enterprise is created as a funding mechanism for the organization and is often structured as a subsidiary business (a nonprofit or for-profit entity) owned by the nonprofit parent. Successful examples of this model cover all or a major portion of the parent organization’s budget.

Similar to service subsidization model, the organizational support model may implement virtually any type of business that leverages its assets. This model is commonplace among western nonprofit organizations across sectors.

Combined Models: Complex and Mixed Models

Model combinations occur within a social enterprise (Complex Model) or at the level of the parent organization (Mixed Model).

Social enterprise models are combined to

1. facilitate enterprise or social program growth;

2. increase revenues by entering new markets or businesses;

3. augment breath or depth of social impact by reaching more people in need or new target populations.

A complex model of social enterprise combines two or more operational models. Complex models are flexible; virtually any number or type of operational models can be combined into one social enterprise. Models are combined to achieve desired impact and revenue objectives. For example, operational models that fall into integrated or external social enterprise categories may yield greater financial benefit, whereas embedded social enterprises offer higher social return, thus models are combined to achieve the dual objectives of the social enterprise. If appropriate for an organization's target population, the employment model is often combined with one of the other models to add social value–i.e. employment and organizational support model. Operational models are often combined as part of a natural diversification and growth strategy as the social enterprise matures.

Mixed models are often a product of an organization’s maturity and social enterprise experience. This model is common among large multi-sector organizations that establish separate departments or subsidiaries for each technical area–i.e. education, health, economic development, etc. and new business ventures. In nonprofits with mature social enterprises, mixed models are the convention, not the exception, a result of expansion and diversification.

Many nonprofit organizations run multi-unit (mixed) operations, each with different social programs, financial objectives, market opportunities and funding structures. Each unit within the mixed model may be related vis-à-vis target population, social sector, mission, markets, or core competencies. A museum for example, in addition to educational art exhibits, might have both a for-profit catalogue business and highly subsidized research and acquisition operation.

Enhanced Models: Franchise and Private-Sector Partnership

The Franchise Model enhances social enterprises by addressing common nonprofit challenges of replication and scale. Technically, any social enterprise that can be reproduced may be applied to the franchise model. Reproduction requires a viable social enterprise model with clear business and social parameters, which is applicable in different markets or across geographical regions.

An organization can franchise its "proven social enterprise model" and sell it to other nonprofits to operate as their own business. Franchising enhancesnonprofit organizations that have viable, yet non-scaleable social enterprises, through replication. For example, a café that employs disabled people may be profitable only when it employs 12 or fewer disabled people. However, if franchised, the café social enterprise can create employment for hundreds of disabled people. Goodwill Industries’ [http://www.goodwill.org] used clothing and furniture retail stores are a good example of an employment model social enterprise achieving scale through the franchise model.

Hence, the franchise model enhances scalability and social value creation through replication. Purchasers pay franchise fees to receive the social enterprise model, methodology, etc., and ongoing technical support from the franchiser. Buying a franchise enables nonprofit organizations to focus on running operations of a proven enterprise, rather than worrying about what type of business to start, which products to sell, or what markets to enter. Becoming a franchiser creates a new social enterprise for the organization that leverages the organization’s industry and business expertise, and in turn creates new social impact opportunities and another source of earned income.

The Private-Sector Partnership Model represents a mutually beneficial relationship between a for-profit company and a nonprofit social enterprise. Relationships are forged on commercial grounds, whereby each partner is a contributor to the commercial success of the venture. The partnership adds value or enhancesthe nonprofit social enterprise by increasing its viability, and hence its social impact, either directly by reaching more clients through its business model, or indirectly by generating funding for social programs. The private partner also benefits vis-à-vis improving goodwill, increasing customer loyalty, penetrating new markets, attracting more socially conscious consumers, etc., which subsequently translates into higher sales and more profit.

The private-nonprofit partnership model of social enterprise is a mutually beneficial business partnership or joint venture between a for-profit company and a nonprofit organization. The partnership may occur with an existing social enterprise, or may result in the creation of a new entity or a profit center. The social enterprise may or may not be mission-related and leverages the nonprofit organization's assets, such as relationships with their target population, community, brand, or expertise. For the for-profit, the partnership yields one or more of the following benefits: lowers costs (cheaper labor/lower research and development costs); reduces restrictions (no strict regulatory oversight); improves community relations or public image; enables new product development; penetrates new markets; or increases sales. Partnership benefits for the nonprofit are financial return, marketing and brand equity, and in cases where the activity is mission-related, social impact. The market is most often external–the public, but examples exist where the paying customer and the client are one. The private-nonprofit relationship may be structured as a joint venture, a licensing agreement, or formal partnership.

Summary and Conclusion

The program will be based in eastern Ukraine, in Kharkiv, and will serve as a leading light and example for eastern Ukraine as well as all of Ukraine. Civil society is action, proof, clear examples demonstrated and carried out with the involvement and intelligence of Ukraine’s citizens who are Ukraine’s great reservoir for hope, prosperity, safety, and security. Nothing less than an opportunity to become actively, positively engaged in their own, their families’, and their neighbors’ well-being and improvement of social standards is needed.

It is proposed that the United States of America be actively engaged in supporting this project, financially and any other way possible. Ukraine has clearly demonstrated common will for democracy. Ukraine has also unilaterally taken the first critical step to fulfill this program, thus clearly demonstrating initiative and commitment to participation required in the original Marshall Plan sixty years ago. The US side is presumably attempting to foster democracy in another country, which never expressed much interest and shows little real interest now. That of course is Iraq, where recent estimates indicate a cost of $1.5 billion per week.

That same amount of money, spread over five years instead of one week, would more than cover the investment cost of the initial components of this project, and allow a reserve fund for creating new projects as Ukraine’s intelligentsia invents them in the Center for Social Enterprise. It is proposed that Ukraine and the US provide equal portions of this amount. Ukraine is certainly able to provide that level of funding, given that projects are designed with the same fiscal discipline employed in the traditional business sector. That means they pay for themselves, one way or another.

Project funding should be placed as a social-benefit fund under oversight of an independent board of directors, particularly including representatives from grassroots level Ukraine citizens action groups, networks, and human rights leaders.

This program provides for near-term social relief for Ukraine’s neediest citizens, most particularly children who normally have least possible influence and no public voice. Over a few years time, the net cost financially is zero. Every component is designed to become financially solvent, through mechanisms of cost-savings and shared revenue with other components. One component, Internet, provides essential communications infrastructure as well as a cash surplus to be used to offset any lingering costs of other components such as childcare, and otherwise goes to a permanent social benefit fund under oversight of the aforementioned independent, citizens-based non-government board of directors.

Any number of other social enterprises can be created. Furthermore, any number of existing for-profit enterprises are entirely free to contribute any percentage of profits they wish to increase the proposed initial $1.5 billion social investment fund. If for example the total fund comes to $3 billion, that amount would generate at least $300 million per year in a hryvnia deposit accounts at any one of several major Ukrainian banks, to provide ongoing funding to continue to create and expand social enterprises.

This strategy places adequate funding for social benefit under control and management independent of government and the very obvious vicissitudes and conflicts inherent therein.

This is a long-term permanently sustainable program, the basis for "people-centered" economic development. Core focus is always on people and their needs, with neediest people having first priority – as contrasted with the eternal chase for financial profit and numbers where people, social benefit, and human well-being are often and routinely overlooked or ignored altogether. This is in keeping with the fundamental objectives of Marshall Plan: policy aimed at hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. This is a bottom-up approach, starting with Ukraine's poorest and most desperate citizens, rather than a "top-down" approach that might not ever benefit them. They cannot wait, particularly children. Impedance by anyone or any group of people constitutes precisely what the original Marshall Plan was dedicated to opposing. Those who suffer most, and those in greatest need, must be helped first -- not secondarily, along the way or by the way.

From there, broad economic and social development can develop "upwards" concurrently with more conventional top-down approaches to economic development. Moreover, this program will not only meet initial, most critical and urgent objectives of childcare reform and poverty relief in Ukraine, it will also provide training for ever-growing numbers of specialists educated in social enterprise economic thinking with sufficient funding to put ever more well-designed projects into action as Ukrainian citizens invent them.

Due to Kharkiv National University’s international student body, education and training will be further distributed throughout the world. This is a program for the common good in Ukraine, with common ground among all political factions regardless of what differences exist otherwise. It will benefit not only Ukraine’s poorest and most vulnerable people, but also Ukraine’s overall economic development and advancement. It will further benefit the developing world as international students train in Ukraine and return for benefit of their home country.

Ukraine now stands on the brink of remarkable opportunity to emerge as an international leader in political, economic and social transformation. Nothing more than real, honest opportunity to fulfill this potential, by ordinary Ukrainian citizens, is needed for that potential to manifest and become reality. The original Marshall Plan greatly assisted Europe. Ukraine’s time has come.

Godspeed.

T. Hallman

Kharkiv, Ukraine

ForUm edition August 2007

Terry Hallman is founder of People-Centered Economic Development, 1997.

References

Assessment of the Adoption System in Ukraine. [PDF] OSCE, October 2005.

Children and Young People Living or Working on the Streets: The Missing Face of the HIV Epidemic in Ukraine. [PDF] Anja Teltschik, 2006.

Community-Based Networks and Innovative Technologies: New models to serve and empower the poor. [PDF] United Nations Development Program series: Making ICT Work for the Poor, 2005.

Constitution of Ukraine, Chapter 2: Human and Citizens’ Rights, Freedoms and Duties. Ukraine, 1996, 2007.

Family Matters - Report on Central and Eastern European Orphanages. [PDF] EveryChild.org, November 2005.

Social Enterprise Typologies. Kim Alter, Virtue Ventures LLC, April 2006.

The Marshall Plan. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (Europe)

Ukraine to see creation of over 400 rehab centers for mentally disabled children. Government of Ukraine, 5 March 2007.

Do you hate it when somebody stops you when you’re saying something important? So do we! It is especially galling when we’re not just letting off steam, but trying to redress wrongs, defend people’s rights – in short make waves. And those with infinitely more money than morals hire the services of hackers to organize a DDOS attack against us.
Well, in financial possibilities, we can’t compete, nobody’s disputing that. What should also be clear is that we have no intention of returning to whispered conversations at the kitchen table..
Our sites are all running again and it’s time to move on, with more than just computer lessons learned.
One is a vital lesson which we per force learned together. We would like to extend a very warm thank you to those who during that time placed our material on their sites and helped us in other ways spread the news. A particularly heartfelt thanks to our friends at HRO.org, who responded immediately, offering a place on their site, posting our material in Russian and English and calling on other human rights organizations worldwide to show solidarity.
We won’t dwell here on why others did not respond. Maybe those who did help had more reason to know about being stifled and intimidated. They knew we needed attention and help in being heard.
We would like to stress, however, here and now that each of us is in danger unless we stand together. Those who wish to silence inconvenient voices have many weapons at hand and these days most transcend borders.
There will be new victims of such attacks unless we show them clearly and unequivocally the senselessness of even trying to stifle our voice.
Help us to teach them that voices carry and that for each stifled voice, many others will be heard throughout the world.
We have decided to create an SOS lifeline. If you have blogs or community sites and would be prepared to place our information in similar emergencies, please write to us at ourvoicescarry@gmail.com Perhaps you don’t have access to a site, but do have an email and would be able to inform others. Please write to us!
If there are some who just won’t understand that freedom must not be crushed, let’s give them one clear message. You will not stifle freedom of speech and don’t bother trying.

Halya Coynash
Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group

In Soviet times you talked of writing “for the drawer”. There was no chance of being published if you didn’t write what they wanted to hear. And if you wrote what they seriously didn’t want to hear, you could end up imprisoned. So people wrote in private and hoped for better times in the future.
The regime fell and those times arrived. Yet here I am in 2007 writing for human rights websites under siege for the fourth day now and trying gloomily to fathom the difference from the situation thirty years ago.
The onslaught began early Sunday evening, on the eve of International Human Rights Day on 10 December. Since that time the websites of the Civic Network “Maidan”, the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union have been subjected to an intensive DDOS [Distributed Denial of Service] assault. The aim is to block the sites through inundating the server with requests for information. The server can’t cope and the sites therefore don’t open.
Whose aim is that then?
We’ve been asking that question ourselves. There are grounds for believing that the attack has been organized from Russia and that those carrying it out are watching us and responding to the manoeuvres we make. In short, this is no novice who’s got to page six of a “Hacking for Dummies” manual and feels the urge to experiment. Furthermore the cost of such an attack per day makes it most unlikely that this was commissioned by any individual with an axe to grind. We would stress also that these large-scale and expensive attacks are undoubtedly planned in advance.
It was clear from the beginning that there were all too many parallels with other attacks on our colleagues, and it is highly improbable that this is mere coincidence.
Only just over a month ago there was an identical attack on the HRO website in Russia during which we tried to give whatever support we could and posted information about their struggle against the virtual assailants. We must also mention some very hard-hitting texts in Russian and English about the illegal expulsion from Russia to Uzbekistan of an Uzbek Abdugani Kamaliyev (Tursinov). This was in violation of Russian legislation and carried out more than 24 hours after the European Court of Human Rights had applied Rule 39 haling the expulsion. These texts were posted on two of the sites www.khpg.org and www.maidan.org.ua with one text literally placed on the sites 24 hours before the attack began.
It seems possible we were meant to draw certain conclusions about the likely consequences if we continued writing what they didn’t “want to hear”.
We have drawn conclusions, although not perhaps those desired. We quite simply have no choice but to continue. In the current political climate it is absolutely vital that we continue being able to report what the media unfortunately ignores.
If we don’t, who will?
That question is taken from a letter sent over the last few days to very many colleagues, journalists and representatives of different organizations. We wrote to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, various UN offices in Ukraine, embassies, international NGOs, media outlets. If this was, as we feared, part of a concentrated assault on human rights organizations reporting on events in post-Soviet countries, it was imperative that we shouted as loudly as possible and that we received at least crucial help in passing on information.
It is a bitter irony that the article on Saturday was specifically about our failure to attract the attention of the media to the threatened expulsion of Abdugani Kamaliyev. It was the media after all who could have asked certain inconvenient questions in high places and perhaps prevented the expulsion.
We are extremely grateful to the HRO team in Russia for their wonderful support and for enabling us to post information about the attack.
There have however been very few responses to our letters. We would in no way wish to criticize anybody. We do understand that everybody has urgent tasks and that it’s not possible to respond to all appeals.
However, we would stress that silence plays into the hands of those who have absolute contempt for human rights and human dignity. We are endeavouring not to be silent, but those fighting us have power and opportunities for pursuing their ends.
Our voices will continue to sound the alarm when human rights are being violated, but if we cannot hope for a receptive ear and help in passing on information, we will be almost powerless.
If that indeed is what those who ordered this attack are hoping to achieve, please help us to ensure that they fail. It will be our shared victory.

Halya Coynash
Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group

Copyright © Terry Hallman 2007. All rights reserved.

Part One

13 December 2007
Early Sunday evening, 9 December, on the eve of Human Rights Day, the server supporting the websites of the human rights organizations Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KHPG), the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), and the “Maidan” website, was subjected to an intensive DDOS [Distributed Denial of Service] assault which is still continuing.
This is a notorious form of closing access to a website or sites by effectively inundating it with a huge number of requests. The sites are overloaded and do not therefore open when Internet users try to access them
Since the attack came just before the announcement in Kyiv at a press conference of the Thistle of the Year Anti-Awards for most persistent human rights violators in 2007, certain unkind thoughts at first seemed warranted.
However, the scale of the attack, as well as many other ominous parallels with other recent onslaughts on human rights websites, forces us to seriously consider other possible explanations.
During a mere 20 minutes, from 22.30 to 22.50 on 10 December, the besieged server was bombarded with more than 150 thousand requests. This level of attack and the cost involved preclude its being the work of amateur hackers, as does the fact that the attack is still not abating.
As of 13 December there is access to some of the sites however the general onslaught has not abated, and such periods of access are followed by renewed attacks. Our investigations give grounds for believing that the attack has been organized from Russia and is being controlled in response to what we do. Attempts to deflect the barrage work for a while until the assailants understand what is being attempted and retarget their attack accordingly.
We are clearly considering why we have been considered so worthy of considerable and costly attention.
Two of the websites involved – www.khpg.org and www.maidan.org.ua had literally over the last week posted articles in both Russian and English regarding the illegal expulsion from Russia to Uzbekistan of an Uzbek Abdugani Kamaliyev (Tursinov) more than 24 hours after the European Court of Human Rights had applied Rule 39 haling the expulsion. The last article http://www.khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id=1197454694 was published on both sites in Russian on Saturday 8 December.
Just over a month ago, the main Russian website HRO.org came under a virtually identical attack and was incapacitated for ten days and forced to use another site. Both KHPG and “Maidan” carried information in both Russian and English about the attack. It should be mentioned (as we did, repeatedly!) that this was by no means the first such attack in Russia. We specifically mentioned the attempt to paralyze the “Memorial” website.
We stressed the need to fight such obvious attempts to stifle the voice of conscience in Russia and neighbouring countries, and the need to show solidarity.
We are very grateful for the enormous help and support which HRO are giving us at the present time. We are even more convinced that we must all be united in this and support one another.
It is possible that those who ordered such an attack found humour in aiming it at Human Rights Day. In fact, however, the event which this day commemorates, the signing and affirmation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, serves as a perfect reminder of all that would be at risk if we give in to such attempts to stifle and intimidate us.
It reminds us also that we need to stand together on this – we have no plans to surrender.
For your freedom and ours.

Yevhen Zakharov, Halya Coynash
Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group

Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group

Responsibility for our future can not be shifted on anybody. That is why launching a new party as a tool of goals fulfillment as well as a leverage for satisfaction needs of information society of Ukraine can be regarded as the next qualitative new step in our aspiration to build an open society of knowledge and equal opportunities.

After three long and eventful years, I have just completed a strategy plan for microeconomic development and poverty relief in Ukraine.  To be clear, that refers to  economic development at the level of individual citizens and families.  The proposal is specifically focused on poverty relief.  At least 25% of Ukrainian human beings suffer poverty -- being poor.  Very, very poor.  Hundreds of Ukrainians have died from cold during the past month because they simply couldn’t afford to be warm enough to survive.

The proposal has three main components, each of which has been thoroughly researched and can be proven in advance to work and achieve the predicted results.  Those components are microenterprise support; nationwide infrastructure for the beginning of high-speed, low-cost urban and rural Internet access; and last but not least, child-care reform aiming to remove children from warehouses (state childrens' homes) into homes more like normal family settings.  The overall project is self-sustaining within four years, meaning it costs Ukraine’s government nothing after that time.  It actually makes profit – all of which goes straight into further poverty relief, Internet expansion, and supporting child-care reform.

The proposal is ready for delivery to, and review by, top government officials in Kyiv, particularly the President.  They are the only people in position to review and approve it.  It is national level, not limited to any one oblast and conversely not omitting any one oblast.  This brings up an interesting little puzzle.

The project was developed in Crimea and Kharkiv, although it could have been done anywhere in Ukraine.  The puzzle is getting it from Kharkiv into the hands of decision-makers in Kyiv.  In Kharkiv, there are special, secret channels to get the proposal to the mayor’s office and the governor’s office, neither of whom have any authority whatsoever regarding the proposal itself.  Furthermore, there is sure to be great interest (there already is) in the Internet component, which returns about 25% per year in profit.  That means for every 1000 grivna input, it returns 250 grivna per year – a 25% return on investment.  Precious few investments return that kind of money.

Thus, every politician that gets his (almost always he for some reason) hands on the proposal gets a chance to strip out the Internet part and use it for personal gain.  Screw poor people and screw kids in orphanages, if a few folks can get rich simply by “borrowing” (stealing) the Internet component.  If I’d wanted to do that, I could probably scare up a few investors and we’d all get rich.  I’ve decided against that because 12 million+ people in poverty seem just a little more important than me and a few other people being very, very rich.  I’ll make enough to be okay, along with millions of other people who would be forgotten if more people don’t reach out and help them.

It’s social capitalism, to use an emerging term: profits can be aimed directly into effective programs to help poor people to not be poor anymore.  This is a sin, disgraceful, outrageous under greed capitalism that has come to be viewed as the only possible form of capitalism on the planet.  Or it was, at least, until the richest capitalist on the planet used the vast majority of his personal profits to do exactly the same thing¹, five or six years after I first proposed this sort of strategy for poverty relief to the US White House ten years ago.²  So it’s sort of new, but not really.  People in Ukraine just haven’t heard of it yet.  But, you have now.

Most Ukrainian officials are greed capitalists.  That’s why they’re in office, and why they wanted to be in office – even after the Orange Revolution.  In that regard, not much has changed in Ukraine.  There is no rational basis to trust most of them with a proposal aimed at poverty relief when they can steal part of it for their own private gain, say they thought of it, pluck some money out of thin air to get started and get richer.

At the same time, local officials need to read the proposal at some point since it will affect their area.  For the start, however, it is essential to minimize the risk of theft of intellectual property.  That means getting the project proposal to decision makers in Kyiv, and then only to trustworthy decision makers.  Which leads to the second part of the puzzle.

In this supposedly democratic country, it seems that absolutely no one knows how to contact their own President or appropriate Presidential aides to be sure that the one person who must read the plan – the President – does read the plan.  It’s already translated from English to Ukrainian, so there is no language barrier.

When I ask about this simple question of getting one proposal to the President, a proposal I know he needs and wants, the response is always hushed whispers: maybe someone knows someone who knows someone who can get it to someone else who might be able to get it someone else and so on.  Almost every little someone – so far – pretends to sit on a special little perch so that this one proposal must get past their importance to get to the next someone else.  That could take months, even if the proposal was released to every little someone along the way – which is not going to happen.  There’s no point in that, and there are good reasons to not do it.

So I decided I’d just put this puzzle up for consideration of citizens of Ukraine.  I’m not at all interested in comments or opinions about the state of the nation, Ukrainian politics, and so on.  I’ve spent three years already studying and thinking about that part.  Now, I’m interested in results.  What have the past three years come to, especially the Orange Revolution, if the President and his Ministers remain inaccessible?  Did anything change?

¹ Time Magazine, Persons of the Year, 2005 (Article is available for free after viewing brief reklama/advertisement. After advertisement loads, click on "Enter Time.com" at the bottom.)


² http://www.p-ced.com/page2.html

President Alexander Lukashenko has been in power for 12 years, during which time opponents have been jailed and violently put down -- and possibly disappeared -- the Times of London reports.

Alexander Milinkevich - a physics professor for 25 years before being fired in 2001 for opposing Lukashenko -- is running against Lukashenko in the March 19 election, and could be considered the front-runner, if not for the prospect of rigged elections, the newspaper said.

Milinkevich said people would take to the streets peacefully when the results are announced, either to celebrate or to protest.

But after the recent revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, supporters of Milinkevich -- including thousands in various youth organizations -- hint at revolt in Belarus.

Lukashenko warned that police will "give them such a going-over they won't know what's hit them," if there are any "provocations."